Spoofing works by convincing a navigation receiver that a fake signal is real, and the only way out is to prove where a signal came from. Galileo ran that proof across Europe for two hours on Sept 16.
Five satellites broadcast the encrypted test signal. Receivers on the Norwegian island of Andoya and at ESA’s navigation laboratory in the Netherlands each computed a position from it, the first live fix made with the Signal Authentication Service, a feature still under development.
The trial ran during Jammertest, the annual exercise where Norwegian authorities deliberately jam and spoof satellite navigation signals so manufacturers can see how their equipment copes under attack.
Why spoofing needs a different answer
Signal power is usually enough to fight jamming. Spoofing is harder to defeat, and mass-market devices need dedicated services to confirm that what they are tracking is genuine.
The new service protects the timing measurements that a receiver turns into a position, using encryption rather than trust. It sits alongside Open Service Navigation Message Authentication, which checks the data a satellite sends about its own location and clock. That feature has been running since 2025.
The next step is validation
The European Commission defined the concept, while ESA and the EU Agency for the Space Programme designed the architecture and upgraded satellites and ground infrastructure. EUSPA, working with the commission, ESA and industry, will run validation and accreditation before the service is declared operational next year.
Both authentication services will be free and available worldwide, and users of Galileo’s High Accuracy Service will inherit the same checks. The Public Regulated Service keeps offering stronger protection for government users.
ESA’s Joerg Hahn said that pairing signal authentication with message authentication gives users confidence that a displayed position can be trusted.
