A two-part essay on the Center for International Maritime Security argues the United States should give commercial space companies a way to fight back against cyber and orbital attacks, reviving a weapon from maritime history.
Author Christopher Rice contends that U.S. civil, commercial and military space operations are interrelated and that the seams between them give rivals openings to attack. He argues competitors, especially China, have invested heavily in targeting American space vulnerabilities both in orbit and online, and that the nation needs a more integrated approach to securing its total space infrastructure.
Part II reviews the policy base. It points to Space Policy Directive 5, which frames space systems as vulnerable to cyber attacks across their lifecycle, from supply chain through design, construction, launch and operations, and to SPD-7, which flags navigation warfare against GPS as a core threat. Rice argues the current structure still contains weaknesses and ambiguities that leave the commercial sector exposed.
His answer is a renewed system of letters of marque and reprisal, the old practice of authorizing private ships to attack enemy vessels, adapted so American space and cyber firms can lawfully defend themselves. Rice pitches it as a way to maximize the security of America’s space sectors while minimizing government cost.
