A satellite that drifts close to another could be delivering fuel, conducting an inspection or preparing to destroy it. A new analysis argues that international law has no clear way to tell the difference.
The essay, published by the Global Security Review, focuses on rendezvous and proximity operations, or RPOs, the maneuvers spacecraft use to match orbits and operate near another object. The Secure World Foundation’s 2026 Global Counterspace Threat Assessment classifies co-orbital weapons as a leading counterspace capability, and RPO technology is inherently dual-use.
Legitimate missions include refueling, repair, on-orbit inspection and life extension. The same techniques can enable surveillance, signal disruption, jamming, sensor blinding, grabbing a satellite or releasing a kinetic anti-satellite weapon.
The analysis notes that the United States, Russia and China have all demonstrated aggressive proximity operations. It cites five US maneuvers in geostationary orbit in 2025 that brought American satellites close to Chinese ones, and recalls the Delta 180 mission, a 1980s test that physically destroyed a satellite. Russia has flown a series of Cosmos and Luch inspection satellites, some co-planar with US spacecraft, and is rebuilding anti-satellite capabilities from Cold War programs.
The core problem is intent. Because a servicing mission and an attack look identical until the final maneuver, states must guess whether a close approach is a threat, which creates conditions for miscalculation and escalation in orbit.
The author argues that clearer rules and transparency measures for proximity operations would reduce that risk before a benign rendezvous is mistaken for the opening move of an attack.
